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ii. DRA5 Design Assumptions
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iv. Conclusion
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Galactic Cosmic Rays (GCR)
• Broad distribution of energy and 
mass
• Can be very energetic ( > GeV)
• Shielding is relatively ineffective
• High-Z shields can worsen the 
effects
• Always present from all 
directions
• Dominant dose contributor 
outside of LEO
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Solar Energetic Particles
• Lighter ions, especially 
protons
• Broad energy distribution, 
skews to lower energy
• Max energy much lower than 
GCR
• Can be shielded
• Sporadic occurrence in the 
form of ‘storms’
Solar Energetic Particles
GCR
From SLS-SPEC-159 (DSNE) 
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Nuclear Reactor Operations
• Emits gamma photons and neutrons
• Both neutral particles – penetrates more readily
• Neutrons slow down by collision with light nuclei
• Captured neutrons can produce secondary gamma 
(prompt or delay)
• Gammas are attenuated by any matter
0E+0
5E-4
1E-3
2E-3
2E-3
3E-3
0 50 100 150 200 250
V
o
lu
m
e
tr
ic
 H
ea
ti
n
g 
R
at
e 
(W
/c
m
3
)
Depth in liquid hydrogen (cm)
Gamma
Neutron
5
Nuclear Reactor Shutdown
• Fission products are unstable and emit 
gamma photons
• Decays quickly after shutdown, 
especially for high energies
• Activation also contributes gammas, but 
is dwarfed by fission products if reactor 
stays in place
Fission product gamma sources build-up and decay (after 1hr operation) in a 560 MW reactor
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Summary
1) GCR
• Low rate 
• Higher Energy
• Mostly ‘unshieldable’
• High-Z shields make it 
worse
2) Solar Energetic Particles
• Sporadic
• In a storm: High rate
• Lower Energy
• ‘Shieldable’
3) Engine Operations
• Short impulse ( < 20min)
• Neutrons shielded by low-
Z material
• Gammas shielded by 
either high-Z or low-Z 
material
4) Engine Shutdown
• Decays quickly
• Gammas shielded by 
either high-Z or low-Z 
material
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Radiation Limits
Example effective dose limits for 1-yr missions resulting in 3% REID.
Assume equal dose to all tissue. No prior occupational exposure.
Females Males
Age
(yr)
Avg US Adult 
Population
Never-
Smoker
Avg US Adult 
Population
Never-
Smokers
30 0.44 Sv 0.60 Sv 0.63 Sv 0.78 Sv
40 0.48 Sv 0.70 Sv 0.70 Sv 0.88 Sv
50 0.54 Sv 0.82 Sv 0.77 Sv 1.00 Sv
60 0.64 Sv 0.98 Sv 0.90 Sv 1.17 Sv
Dose limits for Short-Term or Career Non-Cancer Effects (in mGy-Eq. or mGy)
Organ 30-day limit 1-year limit Career
Lens 1,000 mGy-Eq 2,000 mGy-Eq 4,000 mGy-Eq
Skin 1,500 3,000 6,000
BFO 250 500 N/A
Circ syst 250 500 1000
CNS 500 mGy 1,000 mGy 1,500 mGy
CNS (Z≥10) - 100 mGy 250 mGy
Deterministic
Stochastic
Human Dose Limits
Stepper Motors – 109 Rad
Material Dose Limits
Teflon < 105 Rad
Rubber – 107 Rad
FPGA – 104 Rad
ASIC – 105 Rad
(Warmer)
(Cooler)
Convective
Flow
Nuclear Heating
Pump 
Inlet
Ullage
Stratified
Thermal Limits
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NASA, 2014. Space Flight Human-System Standard Volume 1, 
Revision A: Crew Health (No. NASA-STD-3001).
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Ares V NTP Configuration (from 
executive summary)
10
Mission timeline (from addendum 1)
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Background
• From the Report (NASA-SP-2009-566)
• NTP option used 25klbf engines, predeployed lander and single crew stack ypical
configuration includes the hab, at least 2 tanks (1 core, 0-1 inline and 1+ drop tanks) and 
an engine assembly with 3 25klbf engines
• The stage LH2 tank has an inner diameter of 8.9 m and a propellant capacity of 59.4 t. The 
short in-line tank has a launch mass of 46.6 t and an overall length of 13.3 m including the 
forward and rear adaptor sections, and it holds 34.1 t of LH2.
• It includes two saddle trusses that are open on the underside for jettisoning of the drained 
LH2 drop tank and unused contingency consumables at the appropriate points in the 
mission
• Design includes additional external radiation shielding on each engine for crew protection 
during engine operation.
• Total mass allocation for shielding was 6.45-7.31 mT, depending on assumptions used.
• Shielding material was not explicitly mentioned in detail, but is expected to be some 
combination of plastics, lead, and metal carbides.
• From team members participating in study
• From Addendum 2 in DRA 5,  total mass shielding was 
• 7.31 mt (30% mass margin)  - ~2.43 mT/engine
• 6.45 mT (15% mass margin) - ~2.14 mT/engine
• 5.625 mT, (0% mass margin)  - ~1.88 mT/engine
• The original DRA 5.0 baselined three 25 klbf GC fueled “Pewee-class” engines using HEU. 
Each engine had an internal dome shield, and included a forward external radiation shield 
(~1.5 t per 25 klbf engine) plus some additional localized spot shielding
• The shielding that we’ve provided for our vehicles to date have been geared around 
limiting the crew dose to no more than ~5 rem over the course of the mission. The analysis 
presented at the 2/9/17  NTP team meeting  showed the need for an ~1.4 mT external 
shield* on each 25 klbf engine to maintain a 5 rem limit, so DRA 5.0 was on the 
conservative side with 1.5 t shields and additional spot shielding
*yielded 5 rem total dose to an otherwise entirely unshielded astronaut at 80m from the engine 
(accounting for tanks plus LH2 rundown).
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Mitigation Strategies (MS)
1) Geometry 
A) Distance – Increase engine standoff
• Fixed or extendable engine truss
• Crew habitat location 
B) Shadowing/Scattering – Reduce solid-angle of exposure
• Conical tanks
• Core stage stack sizing
2) Material 
A) Propellant
B) Food/water/equipment (in habitat)
C) Dedicated shield:
• Internal to engine
• External to engine
• Aft face of propellant tank or thrust takeout
• Spot shielding for components
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Staging Considerations
Standard Core Stage                       Thermal ‘Buffer’ Tank
Distance Truss                                          Conical Tank
15
Potential Shielding Locations
a.
b.
d.
e.
f.
a. Internal shielding (per engine)
b. External shielding (per engine)
c. External spot shielding (per component)
d. External shielding (cluster)
e. Water/food/waste ‘Hab-slab’ (< 2𝜋)
f. Water/food/waste ‘Hab-shelter’ (>3𝜋)
c.
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MS 1A) Distance 
Truss
PRO
• Distance is effective 
(view factors)
• No major redesign
• Reduces tank heating
• Smaller shadow shield
CON
• Longer feedlines and docking 
attachments
• Thermal conditioning
• Pump location(s)?
• Packaging constraints
• Control authority (RCS)
• Increased complexity
• Retractable truss
• In-space deployment
• Diminished returns:
• First meter of distance has 
dramatic reduction in view 
factor
• Benefit drops off rapidly with 
added distance
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MS 1B) Geometry 
PRO
• Reduces ‘view-factor’ 
b/w engine and tank
• Smaller shadow 
shield, less thermal 
heating
• For equivalent mass 
of propellant, greater 
‘thickness’ and 
intrinsic shielding
CON
• More mass
• Packaging efficiency in 
payload shroud
• Manufacturing
• Control authority (RCS)
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MS 2A) Buffer/Run 
Tank
PRO
• Uses propellant mass to absorb 
radiation and conducted heat
• Reduces shadow shield diameter (If 
smaller profile tank is used)
• Permits higher pressure with reduced 
mass penalty
• As run-tank:
• Isolates thermal stratification effects to 
smaller volume
• As buffer-tank:
• Route boiloff as ullage pressurant
• Expands pressure-fed operating 
envelope in shutdown/startup transient
• Possibly lends itself to a 
small/inexpensive FTD Option (e.g run 
tank and single engine)
CON
• 2 tanks: mass/shells, ducts, 
valves, TPS
• Added structure mass
• Significant complexity
• Packaging inefficiency
• May require separate launch 
(smaller vehicle is OK)
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MS 2A) Bigger tanks/
More ‘reserve’ propellant
PRO
• Reserve propellant 
nearly eliminates 
neutron dose concern
• Distance bonus for crew 
dose
• More propellant allows 
more contingency
• Better margins for 
propellant losses or off-
nominal operation
CON
• More surface area
• More mass
• Packaging limitations
• Only helps crew dose
• If prop. margin is used, 
crew dose increases
• Post-shutdown: ‘Slosh’ 
makes an unreliable 
shield
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MS 2B) Hab Design: 
Storm Shell-tube
PRO
• Can use water
• Dirty water/brine is OK
• Improves ECLSS margin
• Handles GCR/SPE
• In-line seats
• Situational awareness
• More time in cover
CON
• May use more H2O than 
required by life ECLSS
• No sleeping protection
• May be redundant
• More room required
Cockpit
Berth
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MS 2B) Hab Design:
Food/water/equip.
PRO
• Uses existing mass 
(nothing added)
• Handles GCR/SPE
CON
• Repackaging complexity
• CONOPS
• Must mitigate streaming 
radiation paths (no holes)
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MS 3C) Dedicated Shielding
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a.
b.
d.
e.
f.
a. Internal shielding (per engine)
b. External shielding (per engine)
c. External spot shielding (per component)
d. External shielding (cluster)
e. Water/food/waste ‘Hab-slab’ (< 2𝜋)
f. Water/food/waste ‘Hab-shelter’ (>3𝜋)
c.
Comparison: Shielding Scheme A
a & c
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= Notional radiation limit
= Notional radiation intensity
• Internal shield and spot shielding provide adequate protection for core-adjacent components
• Internal shield and external shield provide adequate protection for propellant systems
• Water/food/etc in habitat provide adequate protection for crew (eliminates any deficit from other shields)
PRO:  Only the required mass is applied to shield each sensitive region.  Crew hab shield also reduces space radiation.
CON:  Requires collaborative shield design with habitat architecture.  Must be configurable for this application.
Comparison: Shielding Scheme B
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= Notional radiation limit
= Notional radiation intensity
• Internal shield and spot shielding provide adequate protection for core-adjacent components
• Internal shield and external shield provide adequate protection for propellant systems AND crew
PRO: Crew dose limits are met with no modification to habitat.
CON: Possibly results in more shield mass than is required.  No additional protection from space radiation.
The notional diagram shown below assumes external shield size is driven dose limit to crew, implying propellant 
can handle high dose.  If propellant is instead determed to be limiting factor, crew habitat may be adequately 
protected without ‘overshielding’ propellant.
Overshielded
a & c
a & b
Conclusions
• Shield design at or near the engine should only account for effects to 
components and propellant.  Any additional mass required for crew (if any) 
should be allocated to the crew hab and can be dual use for other purposes 
(water, food, GCR/SPE shielding) wherever possible.
• When performing shielding  trades, it should be possible to take credit for mass 
in the crew hab (and even add to it if required) when designing the stage. (e.g. 
shielding design may be an iterative/integrated process with the hab).
• All concepts will need some localized shielding at the engines. 
• Think outside the box – Use existing mass as shielding wherever possible
• Think integrated – Design to the environment
• Think ‘Big Picture’ – Remember existing space radiation dose environment
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Future Considerations
Near-term
• Establish thermal limits 
to propellant
• Explore optimal 
propellant-use options
(esp. buffer tank)
• Radiation and MMOD 
Shielding: 
• Composites
• Additive Mfg
• Metal Foams
Long-term
• Split launch 
(SLS/FH/Delta)
• Single engine 
contingency
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Spare Slides
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Water shielding dose comparisons
(Summary slide from 2/9/17)
Per-engine shield mass Crew Hab H2O Estimated Total Dose
Case 1 0 0 7 Sv (700 rem)
Case 2 0 1.0 m 0.2 Sv (20 rem)
Case 3 170 kg 1.0 m 0.05 Sv (5 rem)
Case 4 630 kg 1.0 m 0.01 Sv (1 rem)
Case 5 170 kg 1.7 m 0.01 Sv (1 rem)
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Background
• DRA 5.0 examined several transportation options: All-
chemical, NTP, NEP, and Solar electric
• Executive summary discusses NTP configuration using 
Ares V, addendum includes the NCPS NTP variant using 
SLS 
• NTP option used 25klbf engines, predeployed lander 
and single crew stack
• Typical configuration includes the hab, at least 2 tanks (1 
core, 0-1 inline and 1+ drop tanks) and an engine assembly 
with 3 25klbf engines
• Aggregation orbit was LEO, Mars aggregation at a 1-sol 
orbit
• Six crew members
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Comparison to EMC
DRA 5.0 EMC
Aggregation orbit
LEO (407 km 
circular)
LDRO (cislunar)
Transportation options
Chem, NTP, NEP, 
SEP/Chem
SEP/Chem, Hybrid
Predeployment Cargo only Cargo + return propellant
Mission class
“Fast conjunction” 
Type-I Long-stay
Type-II Long-stay
Crew stack mass (DRA NTP vs 
EMC SEP/Chem)
~356 mT (Ares V) / 
360 mT (SLS)
~270 mT
Launch Vehicle 4-5 Ares V / SLS 4-6 SLS
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Time-series Dose
Linear Scales
Y-axis: Linear
X-axis: Standard
Y-axis: Linear
X-axis: Condensed
(Coast phase x10000)
Dose Rate: 
Engine Ops + Shutdown
Cumulative Dose: 
Engine Ops + Shutdown
Cumulative Dose: 
GCR (1 Sv/yr*)
All doses shown here are only for demonstration and not necessarily representative of expected dose rates. 
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Time-series Dose
Semilog Scales
Y-axis: Log
X-axis: Standard
Y-axis: Log
X-axis: Condensed
(Coast phase x10000)
Dose Rate: 
Engine Ops + Shutdown
Cumulative Dose: 
Engine Ops + Shutdown
Cumulative Dose: 
GCR (1 Sv/yr*)
Burn
Coast
Burn
Coast
All doses shown here are only for demonstration and not necessarily representative of expected dose rates. 
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